We consider a distributed approach to detect and to defend against the low-rate TCP attack [7] . 
Introduction
By providing reliable delivery of user data, TCP simplifies application design and is being used in many network applications including file transfers, e-commerce, and web HTTP access. However, designing a reliable protocol for many heterogeneous users sharing an unreliable network is challenging and involves many subtle issues. Under severe network congestion, for example, TCP requires sources to reduce their congestion window to one packet and wait for a retransmission timeout (RTO) before attempting to resend. If there is further packet loss, the RTO is doubled after each subsequent loss. The RTO needs to ensure that TCP sources will give the network sufficient time to recover from a congestion event; Allman and Paxson [4] recommend a lower bound of one second for its value in order to achieve nearoptimal network throughput.
However, while the TCP RTO can maximize network throughput when users are conforming and cooperative, it can also be exploited by a malicious user to effect a denialof-service attack. In [7] , the authors present a form of lowrate TCP attack, in which an attacker periodically sends attack traffic to overflow a router's queue and cause packet loss. As discussed, a well behaving TCP source will then back off to recover from the congestion and retransmit only after one RTO. If the attacker congests the router again at the times of retransmission, little or no real user traffic can get through. Hence, by synchronizing the attack period to the RTO duration, the attacker can essentially shut off most, if not all, legitimate TCP sources even though the long-term rate of attack traffic can be quite low. The low-rate attack raises serious concern because it can be significantly harder to detect than more traditional brute-force, flooding style attacks. Existing rate-limiting approaches [8, 16] , for example, are designed to control aggressive attackers only.
We are interested in the detection of and defense against low-rate TCP attacks. Since TCP is widely implemented and deployed, a solution requiring changes to TCP and thus widespread modifications of users' software may not be practical. This motivates us to consider a solution approach that can be implemented in a resilient routing infrastructure and benefit a large community of standard TCP users.
For detection, since an attacker's primary objective is to ensure the periodic overflow of a router's buffer, a basic signature of attack traffic will be intermittent short bursts of high rate traffic in between periods of little or no activity (characterized by, say, a periodic square wave). In practice, however, attack traffic can deviate from the basic signature for various reasons: distortion caused by queueing in intermediate routers, aggregation with background traffic (e.g., UDP traffic), an attacker's own attempt to inject "noise" into its traffic to escape detection, etc. Moreover, in a distributed attack, the traffic from individual attack sources may not have the expected traffic characteristics, but the aggregation of such traffic does. Therefore, it is essential to develop de-tection algorithms that are both robust to practical traffic distortions and efficient to carry out even at a busy router.
Once an attack has been detected, we seek to neutralize the effects of the attack traffic and minimize damage to legitimate users. The strategy is to rate limit and preferentially drop packets in an attack burst in order to reduce the loss of good user traffic. Note that the defense method has to provide near perfect isolation in the midst of a low-rate attack and, at the same time, have of low implementation cost.
The contributions of our work are:
We provide a formal method of describing and generating a large family of low-rate attack traffic.
We provide a distributed detection mechanism which uses the dynamic time warping (DTW) method to robustly and efficiently identify low-rate attacks.
We provide a computationally efficient defense method to isolate legitimate traffic from malicious low-rate attack traffic.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a formal model for describing and generating a large family of low-rate attack traffic. In Section 3, we present a distributed approach for detecting the existence of the attack traffic. We also show the robustness and accuracy of the proposed detection method. In Section 4, we present our defense mechanism. Experimental results are presented in Section 5 to illustrate the effectiveness of the defense mechanism. Related work is given in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Formal Description of Low-rate Attacks
Since the low-rate attack can appear in many different forms (as described below), we first provide a formal model of a low-rate TCP attack. Given the mathematical characterization, one can generate a family of low-rate attacks. We will then describe how one can extract signatures from the large family of attack flows.
Mathematical Model of Low-rate Attacks
A low-rate TCP attack is essentially a periodic burst which exploits the homogeneity of the minimum retransmission timeout (RTO) of TCP flows. Consider a router with capacity ¡ (in bits/s). One form of attack is a periodic square wave as described in [7] . The period of the square wave is denoted by ¢ , which is approximately one second so as to effectively force other TCP flows to enter the retransmission state. Within each period, the square wave has a magnitude of zero except for . Again, the objective of the low-rate attack is that for a short duration £ , the attack packets will fill up the buffer of a victim router so that packets of any TCP flows have to be discarded by the router. The packet loss will force most, if not all, TCP flows to enter the retransmission state. Also note that to be considered a low-rate TCP attack, the ratio of £ ¢ has to be small. Otherwise, system administrators can easily detect an attack by its high traffic volume.
A general model of a low-rate TCP attack can be described by five parameters
. The parameters ) to the beginning of the attack pulse, and ) denotes the amount of background noise (i.e., background traffic). The background noise is due to other UDP flows, which will not back off during congestion, or other TCP flows which are not in the retransmission state. Figure 1 illustrates an example of lowrate TCP attack traffic. ).
Let us define the valid range of these five parameters.
Value of
As indicated in [7] , the most effective value for the periodic low-rate attack is ¢ 3 second. In our study, we consider a larger range of 
Another important point to notice is that the low-rate TCP attack can be launched from either a single source, or multiple distributed sources. For the single source attack, it is easy to generate and it is effective when there is sufficient bandwidth between the attack source and the victim router. On the other hand, a distributed attack is more difficult to generate, since doing so requires time synchronization among the attack sources. In other words, the different attack sources, which have different propagation and transmission delays to the victim router, need to synchronize their attack traffic such that the aggregate traffic at the victim router forms a low-rate attack. There are at least two approaches for generating a distributed attack. In the first approach, each of the . These flows will aggregate into a sufficient large burst at the victim router and force the affected TCP flows to back off. Another possible form of distributed attack, which has a lower synchronization requirement, requires each attack source to generate a large burst and for a longer period. For example, each of the 1 attack sources generates a homogeneous and periodic attack waveform with
seconds and a normalized burst size of 
Distributed Detection
To defend against the family of low-rate TCP attacks, the first issue we have to address is how to perform effective detection in a computationally efficient manner. Unlike other intrusion detection or DDoS detection methods [8, 16] , one cannot perform the detection at the victim site, say a web server denoted by 5 . The reason is that the attack traffic will intrinsically "throttle" legitimate TCP flows destined for
5
. Therefore, an attacker does not necessarily need to aim the attack at the victim site, but perhaps at a subset of upstream routers to 5 in order to throttle all the TCP flows passing through the routers.
Instead, we propose a distributed detection mechanism that is installed at a set of routers which are 6 hops away from the victim site. Each router needs to perform attack detection at the output port of packets being forwarded to the victim site
. If a low-rate TCP attack is detected, the router needs to determine the input port(s) from which the attack traffic is being received. Detection will then be carried out at all these input ports of the affected router. If a low-rate attack is detected at an input port, say 8 , then the affected router will push back the detection to all the upstream routers connected to the input 8 . If the affected router cannot detect a low-rate attack at any of its input port, this means that the low-rate attack is being carried out in a distributed manner, and the defense mechanism to be discussed in Section 4 will be carried out. Note that the above distributed detection mechanism has several important features. They are:
It pushes the detection of low-rate attacks as close as possible to the attack sources, and
It is able to minimize damage to the legitimate TCP flows.
The overall detection mechanism can be described as follows:
Distributed Detection Mechanism Let

9
be the deployment router. If (attack exists for input port
signals all upstream routers connected to 8 I to perform distributed low-rate attack detection;
5. execute the defense mechanism described in Sec. 4; 6
General Design of Detection
It is easy for an attacker to generate attack packets with spoofed header information (e.g., IP source address and type of transport protocol). There is no easy way to accurately differentiate low-rate TCP attack packets from legitimate packets. Instead, we must detect a low-rate TCP at-tack by matching current packet arrivals to given attack pattern signatures.
The detection mechanism is to be installed at a deployment router. It involves the following steps:
Statistical sampling of incoming traffic: Traffic will be sampled and normalized using the transmission capacity of the network link.
Noise filtering: Since other packets which arrive during the inactive period of a low-rate attack will also be included in the sampling process, one has to perform filtering before the feature extraction process.
Feature extraction: We need to perform computationally efficient feature extraction that is resilient against time and space shifts.
Signature matching: We need to compare extracted features of the incoming traffic with the signatures of low-rate TCP attack traffic.
Statistical Sampling of Incoming Traffic
Traffic needs to be periodically sampled at a constant rate. Each sample consists of an instantaneous throughput of the link interface. The rate of sampling should be frequent enough to record slight variations of the instantaneous throughput and, at the same time, should not put a heavy computational burden on the router. Note that statistical sampling can be easily achieved using standardized algorithms or off-the-shelf signal processing chips. The length of each sampling period, denoted by ¢ , should also be properly chosen. In order to capture the periodicity of a low-rate TCP attack, the sampling period should be lower bounded by
. One should also put an upper bound on ¢ . Note that a high value of ¢ implies a higher storage cost, a higher computational cost for feature extraction at a later stage, and larger delay in detecting the attack. In our prototype, we have
seconds. Another technical issue we have to consider is traffic normalization. Since different link interfaces may have different line speeds, to facilitate feature extraction and matching at a later stage, the sampled traffic signal of a given link interface will be normalized by its line speed such that normalized throughput 3 sampled throughput maximum line speed 
Noise Filtering
The sampled input should be treated before the feature extraction process. Note that besides potential low-rate TCP attack packets, some other packets may also be included in the sampling process. These packets include:
Packets that are forwarded to the same port but are not destined for the victim site 5 . TCP packets -especially from flows with large RTTs -which can survive the low-rate TCP attack [7] .
UDP packets which will not back off in the face of low-rate attacks or network congestion in general.
These types of traffic have either higher frequencies or smaller magnitudes, as compared with the burst characteristics of a low-rate attack. To get a clean signal, a low-pass filter can be used to filter out the high frequencies and, at the same time, clamp all sampled signals to zero if they are less than or equal to a fraction ' of the peak value ¤ . In our prototype, we set ' 3 © B F .
Feature Extraction
We use auto-correlation to extract the periodic signatures of an input signal. We use the auto-correlation measure not only because it is easy to calculate (e.g., for a sampled input of size ¥ , the computational complexity is
), but one can also check the randomness or periodicity of a given signal in the presence of a time shift 
To illustrate, consider the following auto-correlation plots. Figure 2 (a) shows the noise-filtered input signal with time shift second, respectively. Note that this is the "classical" lowrate attack waveform. Figure 2(b) shows the corresponding auto-correlation plot. One important observation is that the peak-to-peak distance is 1, which captures the period of the input signal and that the auto-correlation plot is the same, independent of the time shift value & . Consider a more complicated attack waveform which is illustrated in Figure 3(a) . In this attack, the time shift is . The auto-correlation plot in Figure 3(b) reveals the existence of a period (i.e., the peak-to-peak distance in the auto-correlation plot) and that the bursts may have different durations.
Again, we extract the feature of auto-correlation plot from an input signal not only because it captures the periodicity property, but also because it eliminates the prob- . lem of time shifting. The next question we need to address is how to compare the auto-correlation plot of an input signal with the auto-correlation plot (or signature) of a low-rate attack.
Pattern Matching via Dynamic Time Wrapping (DTW)
After the above steps, features are extracted from the sampled input. One now has to compare the similarity between the extracted features and the signatures of low-rate attack traffic, and decide whether there is an ongoing attack or not. An example signature of a low-rate attack is shown in Figure 2(b) . If the auto-correlation plot of the sampled input is exactly the same as this signature, one can easily conclude the existence of a low-rate attack. However, not all auto-correlation plots of sampled inputs will match exactly the signature -for instance, consider the auto-correlation plot in Figure 3b) . Therefore, one has to do more intricate processing so as to make an accurate decision.
The mechanism we adopt is called dynamic time warping (DTW) [6, 9] . It is a robust and computationally efficient method for comparing the similarity between a template signature and an input signal, even when the input signal is subjected to changes in time scale and magnitude. The dynamic time warping algorithm can be described as follows. Suppose there are two time series, the template . This restricts the allowable steps in the warping path to be adjacent cells.
Monotonicity constraint:
Given . This restricts points in % to be monotonically spaced in time.
Note that there are many warping paths that satisfy the above constraints. However, we are interested in a path that minimizes the warping cost of 
In other words, the lower the value of , the higher the similarity degree of the input string as compared with the signature 5 . The minimum cost warping path can be found using a dynamic programming approach. That is, we construct a matrix is:
. At each step of calculating the value of
, it means that there is one point in the input signal that has been matched twice to the template 5 , or there is one point in 5 that has been matched twice to . Although this scenario is common in other applications like speech recognition and can be viewed as the homology of the input and the template, the matchings cannot be regarded as identical attack traffic patterns. As a result, we make a modification to the original DTW algorithm that adds some adaptive penalty ¡ and ¢ for this kind of vertical or horizontal "movement" in the warping path so as to evaluate the similarity while still distinguish the slight difference. However, the value of the penalty should not be too large. Otherwise, it will badly increase the DTW value of similar attacks, thus increasing the intersection of normal traffic and attack traffic, which in turn leads to high false positive and false negative rates. As a result, we choose the function of calculating the cumulative distances in our system to be:
After creating the matrix h , the value
is the minimum cumulative distances of the DTW between the template 5 and the input and it is the solution to Eq. (2). In general, a lower value of DTW implies that the input signal is more similar to the signature , which is acceptable in practice.
Robustness and Accuracy of DTW
In this section, we consider the robustness and accuracy of using DTW in detecting low rate TCP attacks. The experimental setup is as follows. For the low-rate attack signature, we consider . The burst length is uniformly distributed within . We generate 1000 samples for each of the three types of input traffic discussed above. The results are illustrated in Table 1 . From the results, we find that a large family of low rate attack has a DTW value that is less than or equal to 60 and that close to 90% has a value less than or equal to 10.
Values of Square General
Step 
DTW values for normal traffic:
The detection mechanism must distinguish normal traffic from the attack traffic so as to avoid false positives and false negatives. Therefore, it is desirable for the minimum DTW value of the normal traffic to be larger than the maximum DTW value of any attack traffic for clear distinction between the two types of traffic. We carry out the following experiment with normal traffic. Based on our assumption before, if there is no low-rate attack, the TCP flows will not back off, and all the traffic including TCP and UDP packets will be processed by a router as usual. We assume that the normal traffic consists of a major constant throughput with some Gaussian noise. I.e., normal traffic 0.05 and for each value of ¡ , we generate 100 different values of
)
. The results are shown in Table 2 . As we can observe, the minimum DTW value for normal traffic is above 60 and we can use it as the threshold of detecting the existence of a low-rate TCP attack. Table 2 . DTW values for normal traffic.
Normal traffic
Probability density function of DTW for normal and attack traffic:
To clearly illustrate the robustness of the proposed detection mechanism, we carry out an experiment to evaluate the DTW values of both attack and normal flows.
For the attack flows, we consider three types of traffic as discussed above. The period ¢ is randomly chosen from
) for differentiating the normal traffic from the attack traffic. 
Low-Rate Attack Defense Mechanism
As we discussed in the distributed detection mechanism in Section 3, a deployment router ' first determines the existence of a low-rate attack at an output port
uses to forward packets to a victim site. When a low-rate attack is detected, ' will then determine the input port(s) on which the attack packets arrive. If attack packets arrive on an input port, say , then ' needs to signal all the upstream routers which are directly connected to to execute the distributed detection algorithm, and then an accompanying defense mechanism to neutralize the effects of the attack. Our motivation is to move the attack detection and defense as close to the source as possible. This way, we minimize the number of TCP flows that will be affected by an attack.
When ' discovers the existence of a low-rate attack at its output port, but cannot identify the attack at any of its input ports, the low-rate attack is being carried out in a distributed manner. For example, the attacker sends a short burst to each of the input ports such that the short bursts will aggregate to a low-rate attack burst an an output port of ' . In this case, ' will need to properly allocate the output port bandwidth so as to minimize the damage to TCP flows going through the port.
In our work, we use the deficit round robin (DRR) algorithm to provide bandwidth allocation and protection between flows. The motivation for using DRR is its near perfect isolation of ill-behaved sources at a very low implementation cost. At the same time, packets from different classes can have different sizes, and fairness can still be achieved [11] . In general, the processing cost of DRR is . At the beginning of a round, deficit counters of all the nonempty classes will be increased by the quantum value. A packet from class Q will be served if the size of the packet is less than or equal to the value in deficit counter [i] . When a packet is transmitted from class 
Experiments
In this section, we report experiments using ns-2 to determine the effectiveness of the proposed defense mechanism. Because of space limit, we only present the results for TCP Tahoe. Please refer to our technical report [14] for results with TCP Reno and NewReno. 
Experiment 1 (Single TCP flow vs single source attack):
The first experiment is shown in Figure 5 . We consider a single low-rate TCP attack and a single TCP flow going through the same router. The latency of each link is 5 ms and the capacity of each link is 5 Mb/s. The low-rate attack is a square burst with . The low-rate attack uses UDP with packet size of 100 bytes. The packet size of the TCP flow is 500 bytes. Under DRR, we set the quantum size of each round to be 500 bytes and the buffer size to 5000 bytes. The result is illustrated in Table 3 . Note that without the defense mechanism, the router simply uses conventional scheduling (i.e., drop tail and FCFS) to handle the packets. Also, we observe that the TCP flow can only utilize around 4% of the link's bandwidth. On the other hand, when one uses DRR, we observe an improvement in the TCP's throughput from 224.37 kb/s to 3.402 Mb/s, or an improvement from 4.49% to 68.04% of the link capacity. The result shows the effectiveness of the defense mechanism in protecting the TCP flows from the malicious attacking flows. . The buffer size of the DRR-enabled router is 12.5 kbytes. The results are illustrated in Table 4 Figure 7 . We consider a distributed low-rate TCP attack and 8 TCP flows going through the same router. Parameters are the same as in Experiment 2 except that we replace a single attacker by three distributed attackers. Each attacker sends a periodic attack burst every sec. The results are illustrated in Table 5 . One can observe that with DRR, we can improve the throughput of all the TCP flows from 469.67 kb/s to 4.296 Mb/s, or an improvement from 9.39% to 85.94% of the link capacity. . All of them try to upload files to the server. Table 6 shows the throughput of attack and TCP flows when no defense mechanism is deployed (under the drop tail column), and the throughput of the various flows when DRR is employed at the different routers. The table shows that enabling DRR at the different routers will achieve different TCP throughputs. In particular, when DRR is enabled in will discover the presence of the low-rate attack and therefore enable DRR scheduling. One can observe that fairness is achieved in which all the TCP flows achieve approximately the same amount of bandwidth, and they are protected and isolated from the malicious attack traffic.
Related Work
Network denial of service is a well recognized problem of importance and urgency (e.g., [2, 3] rate attacks [1, 8, 10, 13] . The low-rate TCP attack is first described by Kuzmanovic and Knightly [7] , who characterize the attack and point out important challenges of detection and defense. Since low-rate attacks are most effective when the retransmission attempts by TCP sources are synchronized following a congestion, randomizing the TCP RTO is an intuitive solution approach and has been shown to be effective in [15] . However, randomizing the RTO requires widespread updates of existing end user software and may reduce the performance of TCP under non-attack conditions [4] . In comparison, we seek a solution at the router level. Other DDoS solutions at this level, but with a different focus than ours, include IP traceback [10] , hash-based IP traceback for low volume traffic [12] , pushback rate limit [8, 16] , and the eXplicit Control Protocol (XCP) [5] .
Conclusion
This paper presents an efficient mechanism to dynamically detect and defend against low-rate TCP attacks. We present a formal model to describe a large family of low-rate TCP attack patterns. We then propose a distributed detection mechanism which uses the dynamic time warping algorithm to compare the feature of the sampled input with the signature of the low-rate attack. We show that the detection mechanism is robust and accurate in identifying the existence of low-rate attacks. When a low-rate attack is present, we use a pushback mechanism to identify the attack as close to the attack source as possible. The reason of this pushback is to minimize the number of affected TCP flows. We show that one can use the deficit round-robin algorithm to protect the TCP flows and isolate them from the attack traffic. Extensive simulation experiments are reported to quantify the robustness and accuracy of the proposed detection and defense mechanisms.
